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Partners in business. Roman merchants 
and the potential advantages of being a 
collegiatus 
 
Trading costs in Roman commerce: problems and solutions 
 
Modern markets can on the whole be assumed to be rather well developed and closely integrated: 
instant communication; easily available information on production, demand and prices; quick 
transport; safe routes etc. all ease the merchant’s business today. Obviously, pre-industrial societies 
never attained this level of efficiency and integration: communication was difficult; information was 
often mutilated, hard to check or already outdated when reaching the merchant; supply shocks 
heavily influenced prices; transport remained slow and often dangerous etc.1 Hence, ancient markets 
were never frictionless and successful trading was constantly threatened. Large risks and insecurities 
implied that the very basics of market exchange, viz. abundance in one city and shortage in the other, 
did not guarantee commercial profit. Indeed, a merchant’s life was often hard and problems 
plentiful.  
To organize the various shortcomings of the Roman trading world and the solutions merchants tried 
out, we start with the very obvious consideration that, in order for a business enterprise to be 
lucrative, the margin of profit at the end of the transaction had to outweigh the previous 
investments and trading costs. These costs determine the merchant’s actual profit, if any. Recently, 
Kohn proposed to divide trading costs into three separate components, viz. transaction costs, 
transportation costs and financing costs.2 We will use this triad to sketch out some of the problems 
Roman merchants often had to cope with. 
Transaction costs mainly involved the efforts and costs of dealing with the people involved in 
commercial exchange, such as the costs for gathering business information, tracing sellers and 
buyers, reducing competition and looking for protection against perjury and breach of contract. After 
all, in dealing with colleagues and customers, there was always the danger that someone would 
change his promise, commit fraud, provide false information etc. To give but one example: several 
hints in Cicero’s correspondence suggest that around 50 BC, the senator C. Sempronius Rufus, the 
businessman C. Vestorius and M. Tuccius Galeo joined forces in a commercial societas.3 In the 1960’s, 
a wreck was discovered near Marseille, carrying aboard wine amphorae marked with the stamp of 
Galeo and also traces of the typical dye Vestorius had developed and commercialized.4 Apparently, 
the ship was transporting at least two products of the socii and we can safely assume that it was en 
route from Italy to Gaul or Spain. Rufus’ part in the societas is not exactly clear, but as a senator he 
might have been responsible for the venture’s financial back-up. Theoretically, all profits and losses 
were equally distributed between the socii and Sempronius, Vestorius and Tuccius should all have 
shared the damages resulting from the shipwreck. However, Cicero also alludes to a conflict between 
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Sempronius and his two socii with Tuccius taking legal action against Sempronius.5 It is very well 
possible that Sempronius refused to accept his share in the commercial losses and reneged on the 
obligations to his business partners, who therefore failed to recover part of their investments and 
additionally lost time and effort in proceeding against their former socius. 
Transportation costs, the second component, obviously included the costs of moving goods, i.e. 
freight and wages, but also taxes, tolls and occasional losses due to corrupt customs officers, 
shipwreck, piracy or banditry. One only has to look in Parker’s famous catalogue of Roman wrecks to 
see that crossing the Mediterranean was often a risky business.6 A few ancient texts also point out 
that it was often desirable for merchants to offer a bribe to the customs house, to speed up or evade 
the search for contraband.7 
Lastly, financing costs comprised costs caused by the delay between buying and selling: scarcity of 
ready cash, changing market conditions and fluctuating prices could easily turn a promising venture 
into disaster. One can find an apt illustration of these difficulties in the tale of the poor merchant in 
Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, who heard of an interesting sale of fresh, first-rate cheese in a 
neighboring village and immediately travelled to the market place.8 Alas, spes compendii frustrata 
est: upon arriving he found out that all the cheese had been sold to the wholesale trader Lupus 
(negotiator magnarius). The news had reached the merchant too late or his preparations, finding 
money and transport, had taken too much time. Instead of making some profits, he had lost time, 
effort and probably some money on the journey too. 
 
Yet, Roman merchants tried to tackle these market shortcomings and reduce trading costs, whenever 
possible, to make their business more efficient.  
Theoretically, major technological progress would be the most secure and effective way to lower the 
need for commercial investments. Developing quicker and larger means of transport or reducing the 
delay in harbors by improving port infrastructure would definitely help merchants to rapidly adapt to 
changing market conditions. A few technological achievements did indeed smooth Roman 
commercial exchange. Two examples can suffice. 
First the transport capacity of Roman ships. Ancient fabri navales are said to have possessed the 
knowledge to construct ships with a cargo capacity which, to pre-industrial standards, was 
exceptionally large. Both Hiero’s Syracusia and Lucian’s Isis, the most famous giant vessels in 
antiquity, are believed to have measured more than a thousand tons.9 Yet, we do not necessarily 
have to believe these literary records.10 After all, before the Industrial Revolution, ships with a similar 
tonnage were very rare and hence gained in our sources “the immortality of freaks”.11 Still, we can 
turn to more reliable, legal documents: in the second century AD, shippers who wanted to work for 
the annona and enjoy the various financial and legal privileges, were required to offer a ship with a 
minimum cargo capacity of 50000 modii or some 435 tons.12 Again, in a pre-industrial society, these 
were ships with a more than average tonnage. But Rome needed this level of transport capacity: 
Tchernia calculated that during the first century AD, some 800 ships with a cargo capacity of 250 tons 
on average were needed to annually supply the capital with grain, oil and wine alone.13 Because the 
next century, the annona was able to demand ships with an even higher tonnage, a ship of 250 tons 
can hardly have been very rare on the sea routes leading to Rome. When comparing these figures to 
the merchant marine supplying and trading in the capitals of other pre-industrial societies, the 
conclusion can only be that Rome could rely on huge fleet of remarkably large ships. In the port 
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registers of 18th-century Paris, Tchernia found only 400 ships measuring more than 100 tons. Davis 
came to very similar conclusions for 17th- and 18th-century London.14 It is obviously true that investing 
in these large vessels was encouraged by the annona: regular transport contracts were guaranteed 
and Rome’s demand for food would never decrease. Nonetheless, once these ships had fulfilled their 
duties for the praefectus annonae, they were free to engage in private enterprises. Hence, not only 
Rome but also the commercial exchange in the whole of the Mediterranean benefitted from the high 
tonnages. 
Secondly, one could also point to the introduction of ships with dolia attached in the hold. These 
large containers could easily hold 2000 l wine. For merchants engaged in bulk transport of cheap 
wine, it was really worthwhile to invest in the dolia technique: Hesnard has calculated that thanks to 
the dolia, the shipper of the wreck Grand Ribaud D was able to take aboard 50% more wine than 
when he had used amphorae.15 These containers not only had a very interesting content-packaging-
ratio, but also freed the shipper from the time-consuming need to buy, fill and seal amphorae. 
Obviously, dolia ships had also some disadvantages: the choice of a return cargo was rather limited, 
the ship’s stability decreased and bulk wine trade was only possible between stable and rather well 
integrated markets. No doubt, these purpose-built ships could easily prove their value in the supply 
of Rome with Gallic and Spanish wine.  
 
So, technological achievements easing commercial exchange were not unknown to the Roman 
trading world. Recently however, Scheidel has convincingly argued that major technological change 
was never the most important factor in Roman commercial expansion and the reduction of trading 
costs.16 The consequences of the political framework of the empire turned out to be far more 
significant: the centuries of internal peace, the negligibility of piracy in the mare nostrum, low 
taxation, Latin and Greek as linguae francae, Roman law and his apt system for agency by slaves and 
freedmen etc. all helped to make the merchants’ life a lot easier.  
Yet, technological progress and the political superstructure were far from the only determinants in 
Rome’s commercial expansion. This paper will argue that the numerous professional organizations in 
the Roman empire, bringing together merchants and shippers and creating the possibility of valuable 
networking, also played a considerable part in enhancing the efficiency of Roman trade.17 
 
Roman collegia: a blend of sociability and economic purposes 
 
Despite a long tradition of scholarship on Roman associations, studies often paid little attention to 
the potential role they could play in their members’ professional life: collegia were said to be the 
place to share cultural and religious beliefs, a safe way for the poor to assure themselves of a burial 
or a vehicle for occasional convivial meetings to shortly forget everyday life concerns.18 This view is 
now rightly criticized for underestimating the protection and cooperation the institutional framework 
of the collegium had to offer and the association’s potential to act as a status enhancer.19 Thus, the 
collegium was hardly ever a single-purpose association, but combined several socio-economic 
functions. It is now recognized that, just as in all pre-industrial communities, merchants tried to build 
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various networks of colleagues and protectors, who would be able to assist in combating market 
imperfections, and that the collegium could be a valuable asset in the search for protection.  
Still, few authors have tried to make tangible the actual advantages a businessman, being a 
collegiatus, could enjoy. Making use of the concept of trading costs in an imperfect market, we will 
look into a few commercial shortcomings of the Roman trading world and the solutions professional 
associations could offer. As usual, evidence on the actual functioning of Roman collegia is scarce and 
often isolated. Hence, this paper will be more about possibilities than about facts. 
 
The trustworthiness of a collegiatus 
 
Trust is an essential feature of any kind of business relations, because in a commercial transaction, a 
merchant often had to rely on the mere assumption or promise that he would not be deceived by his 
agent or customers. Once the merchant was out of sight, agents could easily run away with the 
entrusted money; fraudulent sellers could try and offer inferior products or unexpectedly sell to 
another merchant; and buyers may try to postpone paying or revoke previous orders.  
Consequently, trust could never be taken for granted and had to be monitored. Only a mix of 
observation of previous behavior, expectations and peer control could ensure a merchant that his 
business contacts were unlikely to cheat on him. The more information a merchant could gather on 
his partners or the closer the ties which connected him to the others, the safer his business would 
be. Yet, due to the obvious difficulties in assessing the character and honesty of a business partner 
one may be dealing with for only a short period, trusting someone always implied a certain risk. 
Here, networking was an obvious solution in the search for reliable partners. 
In the theory of social networking, two main factors which increase mutual trust and bonding, are 
distinguished, viz. closure and multiplex relationships.20 Closure implies that membership of a 
network is limited to individuals who share, or are ready to accept, a very similar set of interests, 
values, social rules and convictions. This way it is possible to (informally) control the behavior of 
single members, punish malpractice and reward loyalty. The concept of multiplex relationships on 
the other hand refers to the network’s capability of closely tying the individual members with more 
than one common feature. Members not only share membership in the network, but also the same 
religious belief, origin, social background, upbringing, cultural taste etc. The more ties, the closer the 
connection between the members and the more likely they are to help and protect each other. 
These two factors can easily be traced in the structure of the Roman commercial collegia.  
 
Closure was obviously essential to any association, and commercial collegia were no different: all 
merchants evidently shared a few common professional objectives and values. At a very basic level, 
each merchant yearned for long-term profit in a safe, and if possible, quick and easy way. This usually 
implied fair trading and building a good reputation. If the majority of the collegiati could indeed rely 
on standing and fame, a merchant known for fraud and cheating would have a hard time gaining 
entrance into the network. The reason is obvious: one swindling trader could easily corrupt the 
association’s reputation. If he really wanted to join the network, he had to comply with the set of 
norms and social standards of the association. The religious association of the Diana and Antinoüs 
worshippers stated clearly that whoever wanted to become a member, should read the ordinance 
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very carefully, so there was no misunderstanding about the purpose and rules of the collegium.21 The 
application of candidates for the membership could also be thoroughly investigated by screening 
their character, reputation and, if possible, previous behavior. This procedure was certainly part of 
the adlectio.22 The famous lex of the association of negotiatores eborarii et citrarii clearly states that 
it was part of the curatores’ responsibility to check the candidates’ background and report to the 
quinquennales.23 The curatores were not supposed to undertake this screening light-heartedly, for if 
someone was unjustly accepted, their names would be removed from the association’s roll.24 
Therefore, being accepted as a member of a professional association implied that the merchant was 
found worthy to enter the network and that his professional integrity was recognized. The official 
adlectio also implied that the closure of the Roman commercial associations was very well defined 
and institutionalized: one was simply accepted as a collegiatus or not. Membership was officially 
restricted and not freely obtainable. 
When we look at the composition of a few Roman merchant associations, it becomes clear why this 
screening and closure was necessary. Take for instance the corpus negotiatorum vinariorum 
Luguduni in canabis consistentium. The phrasing consistentes already reveals that not all members 
originate from the immediate surroundings of Lyon, but had (temporarily) settled in the city for 
commercial reasons. Two wine merchants explicitly state they belonged to the cives Treveri, while a 
third one was probably born in Alba.25 Apparently, Lyon offered extraordinary trading opportunities, 
so merchants from all over Gaul and Germany moved to the commercial district near the confluence 
of the Rhône and Saône. The same pattern can be traced for associations as the utriclarii Lugduni 
consistentes, with members from Rouen and Trier, or the nautae Rhodanici et Ararici, incorporating 
shippers from Vienne, Trier and Lyon.26 These associations all brought together merchants and 
shippers with a very different socio-economic background, who may have settled only temporarily in 
the city where the collegium was established.27 Checking on their professional history and monitoring 
their actions was thus necessary to safeguard the association’s reputation. Gathering information 
about candidates for the collegium and controlling behavior is easily traceable in the history of the 
association: openness to members who did not originate from the town or did not reside there all 
the time, was a feature Roman collegia shared with early medieval merchant guilds.28 
This procedure of screening and control offered valuable information to the merchant’s business 
partners and customers. The merchant had earned his membership based on his honesty and proper 
behavior before his election into the association. Moreover, his future actions would be monitored 
by his colleagues in the collegium to prevent him from harming the association’s reputation. This 
peer control could be taken, as it were, as a guarantee for the merchant-collegiatus’ fair trading. 
Finally, membership implied that the merchant did not appear as an isolated factor in the Roman 
trading world, but as a respected colleague who could count on the association’s protection and 
assistance.29 To underline this collegiality and mutual bonding, collegiati sometimes wore special 
insignia, explicitly confirming their membership and acceptance in the commercial network. For the 
utriclarii, we possess two personalized bronze tesserae or insignia, on which the name of the trader 
and his association was engraved, together with the image of an animal skin in which they used to 
transport wine and oil.30 Wearing the tessera was a clear sign to potential customers that the 
utriclarius was regarded as a trustworthy business partner. 
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Secondly, multiplex relationships. Roman merchants did indeed often share more features than mere 
professional interests. A good example of a very dense structure of multiplex relationships is offered 
by the inscription of the cultores Iovis Heliopolitani Berytenses qui Puteolis consistunt.31 The phrase 
qui consistunt most likely refers to the commercial interests of the cultores. The members of this 
association shared profession, religion, origin and geographical sphere of activity. Likewise, many of 
the associations which grouped Roman businessmen operating on Delos during the last century of 
the Republic, combined professional interests and religious conviction.32 This kind of association with 
multiplex relationships was typical for merchants, operating in a foreign city and structuring shelter 
around a common identity and background. Roman epigraphy abounds with testimonies of these 
collegia, but the Piazzale delle Corporazioni in Ostia, with tenths of professional organizations 
grouping merchants and shippers from Africa, Sardinia and Egypt, offers the best example.33  
Careful screening was here less of an issue, as the different ties guaranteed the collegium various 
means to gather information or call a cheating colleague to order. We can also safely assume that 
local associations as the corpus negotiantium Malacitanorum or the collegium utriclariorum 
Nemausensium mainly consisted of traders whose origins were lying in the vicinity of the town which 
had given the association its name.34 It is likely that the majority of the members knew each other’s 
family and background. Unlike associations which grouped members with a very disparate origin, 
here monitoring and peer control was not only entrusted to the collegiati, but could be more deeply 
rooted in the social texture of the city. In case a collegiatus’ behavior was unacceptable, his 
colleagues had recourse to his relatives and friends in order to discipline him. 
 
The combination of closure and multiplex relationships often implied that the feeling of solidarity 
and bonding between the collegiati could be rather intense and emotional. This feature is possibly 
reflected in the funerary inscription of Sex. Haparonius Iustinus, a negotiator seplasiarius, who was 
buried by his fratres.35 It seems unlikely that these were his actual brothers, because contrary to the 
epigraphic habit, no names are mentioned. Maybe this affectionate phrasing was used to denote his 
colleagues in an association of negotiatores, who to the deceased were no less than his real fratres. 
This psychological link to the strength of family ties implies that collegiati were supposed to be as 
reliable as the next of kin. 
The following sections will explore various solutions to friction in the Roman trading world, which all 
originate within the framework of the merchant association. 
 
Agency and reputation 
 
It goes without saying that, very often, a businessman was unable or unwilling to personally look 
after each and every stage of his enterprise. Then agency could be the answer, as this technique 
efficiently enabled the merchant to save time, evade personal risk, increase the range of his activities 
etc. Yet, in every pre-industrial society, agency was severely hampered by the fact that instant 
communication between principal and agent was regularly quite impossible. Monitoring the actions 
of an agent abroad was very difficult and the risk of assigning an order to a fraudulent manager was 
very real. Even Cicero had to admit that he had absolutely no clue where one of his dispensatores 
was staying and that he feared to encounter financial losses very soon.36 Efficiently handling the need 
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of reliance was one of the major challenges of pre-industrial trade. Rome tried to cope with this 
problem in two ways. First, an extensive legal framework was set up to structure the various levels of 
agency and determine the liability of the different partners.37 Secondly, businessmen counted on 
their familia of relatives, slaves and freedmen to protect their interests. Kinship and dependency 
were thought to be decent vehicles to judge an agent’s qualities and increase his trustworthiness. 
Even today, when the swiftness of information technology can aptly be used to check up on an 
agent’s performance, the threat of the cheating agent is still not completely countered and kinship is 
still regarded as a guarantee for honesty.38 Yet, making use of the advantages of being a collegiatus 
may prove to be a valuable alternative for the familia. 
 
The collegium could first of all be used by merchants, who were relying on their own freedmen and 
slaves as overseas agents, to check on their activities. Merchants operating on an interregional level 
often entrusted parts of their business to members of the familia, even if a regular and thorough 
control was seldom possible. Freedmen and slaves may then be temporarily settled in a harbor or 
city the merchant was visiting regularly, to arrange sales and purchases on the local market.39 When 
several collegiati were trading along the same routes, a merchant may ask a colleague, who was 
planning a business trip to the place where the agent was residing, to check on his reliability and 
local social credit. For instance, D. Caecilius Hospitalis was a Spanish oil merchant, who appeared to 
have regularly supplied the market of Rome: as curator of the negotiatores olearii ex Baetica, he and 
his colleague Cassius Faustus were responsible for the dedication of an honorary inscription for M. 
Petronius Honoratus, a former praefectus annonae.40 Moreover, Hospitalis’ name is found in the 
painted inscriptions (tituli picti) on Spanish oil amphorae on Monte Testaccio.41 In Rome, we also 
encounter apparent members of his familia, who were active in the oil trade too and who seem to 
have been residing in the capital for quite a while, as they managed to become apparitores there and 
left several traces in funerary epigraphy: D. Caecilius Abascanthus was a diffusor olearius ex Baetica 
and a lictor curiatus who buried his wife in Rome, while D. Caecilius Onesimus, a viator and a diffusor 
too, was buried in the capital by his heirs.42 Evidently, the DD. Caecilii had a strong tradition of 
trading contacts between Baetica and Italy. Let use assume that Caecilius Hospitalis was regularly 
shipping oil to Rome and that one of his slaves or freedmen lived there, received the amphorae, took 
care of storage and selling at the appropriate time, and made sure each time a return cargo was 
ready for Hospitalis to take back to Spain. Theoretically, this way Hospitalis would be able to avoid 
any delays in the harbor and quickly start up a following enterprise. One day, Hospitalis arrives in 
Rome, contacts his agent and notices that the profits of his last shipment had seriously decreased, 
compared to previous dealings. Possibly, his agent was cheating on him and had embezzled part of 
the money. On his return in Baetica, Hospitalis may have asked his fellow curator Cassius Faustus, 
who was preparing a shipment to Italy, to keep an eye on his agent whilst doing business in Rome. 
Hospitalis would then be able to confront his fraudulent agent with the evidence, furnished by his 
collegiatus.  
Even before the suspicion of fraud arose, a merchant could rely on a collegiatus to gather 
information about market conditions and trading opportunities in the city where his agent was 
operating. This way it would theoretically be possible to regularly monitor an agent’s aptitude for 
business and to control the veracity of his claims. 
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Yet, it has to remain uncertain how often and how efficiently this technique of monitoring was used 
in the Roman trading world. No correspondence between merchants survives which could reveal the 
functioning of similar mechanisms. Nonetheless, we know for sure that medieval merchants trading 
on the Mediterranean were intensively relying on colleagues to check on their agents.43 No doubt the 
Roman collegium at least furnished the framework in which this kind of agreements and control was 
possible. 
 
We can also imagine that sometimes, a merchant could not rely on his own familia to find a 
trustworthy agent. Then the collegium offered a ready network of colleagues who may have been 
willing to temporarily help their fellow merchant themselves, or to instruct one of their slaves or 
freedmen to act as an agent. For instance, one of the most influential second-century grain 
merchants in Ostia was P. Aufidius Fortis. He was a quinquennalis perpetuus of the mercatores 
frumentarii, a wealthy patron and municipal magistrate. Let us assume that one of the collegiati 
requested help in shipping grain to Ostia. It was probably not likely that Fortis, being the most 
prominent mercator, would intervene in person, but he may have offered the assistance of two of his 
son’s freedmen, who were also members of the same association.44 
This option seemed very advantageous. The merchant did not have to lose time and effort finding 
and checking the honesty of a potential representative. Maybe he did not even have to pay for the 
services, because a colleague acting as an agent or lending out a slave for free would be able to ask 
to return the favor. Also the mere amicitia between the members could make payments 
superfluous.45 His fellow collegiatus indirectly vowed for the reliability of the agent, because any 
fraudulent behavior of the slave or freedman would instantly harm the reputation of the collegiatus. 
The short-term gain of cheating could never outweigh the long-term loss of credit and credibility 
within the collegium.  
Members would be able to quickly distinguish between honest familiae and free riders in the 
association. Information on the honesty of an agent could easily be circulated on the collegium’s 
meetings or outside this structure. The ordinance of the cultores Dianae et Antinoi, be it a religious 
association, clearly states that complaints can be brought forward to the assembly.46 During the reign 
of Tiberius, the lex of an unknown Egyptian association declared that “if anyone misconducts himself, 
let him be fined whatever the society may decide”.47 In yet another papyrus, dated to the end of the 
fifth century, the association of tow-merchants addressed the defensor of Oxyrhynchus and filed an 
official complaint against one of their members for failing to respect the regulations.48 The 
association, or more precisely, the body of magistrates operated as a structure of governance to deal 
with internal disputes and would no doubt encourage cooperation or punish refusal and betrayal. 
This was obviously more efficient and less time-consuming than bringing disputes before court. If the 
magistrates however did not succeed in dealing with the issue, further steps, as recorded in the fifth-
century papyrus, could evidently be taken. It was very unlikely that colleagues were willing to rely on 
an agent who had cheated on one of them in the past, so the social capital of both the agent and his 
master or patron was immediately harmed. A collegiatus who was not able to control his familia for 
the wellbeing of his colleagues, could easily be isolated from the network. After all, trust and 
cooperation were essential to the basic principle of associating and breaking the rules could hardly 
be tolerated. Hence, both collegiati and their familiae as potential agents were motivated to mutual 
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respect and honesty, fearing the loss of their own reputation and consequently being denied 
entrance to the commercial network. 
 
Another option to remedy the agency problem was to call on the collegium’s slaves and freedmen. 
An association could legally own slaves who were never in the power of the individual collegiati, but 
only dependent on the community.49 It seems feasible however, that when a merchant had 
difficulties in finding a decent agent, the collegium could order the slaves to help the merchant in 
need. Once those slaves gained their freedom, it was the association which operated as a patron. 
Hence, making use of the obligation to obsequium, to which all former slaves were submitted, the 
collegium could claim respect, gratitude and support from his liberti. So we may assume that even 
after the manumission, the collegium’s freedmen were still closely connected to the members and 
their business life.50 Names of freedmen such as Navicularius Victorinus, Publicius Secundanus or 
Vinarius Sulpicianus clearly bore the mark of their previous life as associations’ slaves.51 We know 
that Secundanus still worked as a tabularius of the nautae Mosallici and arranged the association’s 
administration. 
 
Still, it remains very difficult to trace these reputation-based mechanisms of agency in the sources. 
The lack of archives and business letters severely limit our knowledge of potential agency 
relationships. Nonetheless, the institutional structure of the collegium at least made this mechanism 
possible. Moreover, comparative evidence from medieval and early-modern trading communities, on 
which more information is available, affirm merchants frequently resorted to this technique of inner-
association-agency.52 Letters recurrently mention fellow traders taking aboard their ships 
merchandise a colleague wanted to have transported to his manager, selling his wares, buying new 
products etc. These communities were often much larger and less face-to face than the scope of a 
collegium, so if this network and reputation mechanism was applicable to more or less impersonal 
coalitions, it certainly could have worked for a Roman merchant association. 
 
Financial support and networking 
 
By bringing together individuals with the same professional aims and interests and by intertwining 
their personal business networks, the collegium ensured potential business partners that the 
merchant was backed by the means and support of the community. In case something went wrong 
(financial loss, shipwreck etc.) and the merchant had problems dealing with ongoing business 
agreements, the association and individual collegiati were supposed to support him. This way, a 
merchant who faced temporary difficulties, was able to uphold his reputation as a reliable 
businessman.  
 
First, the association as a whole may provide some services to ease the individual members’ 
business. For instance, in Rome, a collegium of negotiantes dedicated an inscription to the genius of 
the horrea Agrippiana.53 It seems feasible that the association was using the common chest to hire 
storage space in the warehouse, which may have been put at the disposal of the collegiati. This way, 
the merchants did not have to search for a depot separately, but were better protected by the 
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association against market fluctuations: in case the demand for certain products was temporarily 
satiated, the common store room could be used till sales would be profitable again. We have also an 
indication that a sixth-century Egyptian association of linen-weavers possessed private workshops, 
which were leased to the collegiati.54 
 
Secondly, collegiati may informally help each other in trying to reduce trading costs. The idea of 
informal mutual support may sound trivial, given the association’s role in constructing sociability and 
promoting friendship. Nonetheless, the ordinance of an Egyptian association deemed it necessary to 
affirm explicitly that “if anyone neglects another in trouble and does not give aid to release him from 
his trouble, let him pay eight drachmai”. No doubt, in the same way as with agency, membership and 
amicitia encouraged collegiati to advance money, grant low-interest or free loans, lend 
infrastructure, provide storage space etc.  
Especially the opportunity to pool finances proved to be very interesting, as the uncertainty of the 
trading business made it hard to predict when exactly a merchant would need a large amount of 
ready cash or when he would be able to repay his loans. Usually, relatives were the first to turn to 
when a trader needed money, but, as with agency, the collegium proved to be a valuable alternative. 
Informally borrowing from a fellow collegiatus-amicus probably implied a certain flexibility in 
repaying. The lender could rely on the monitoring structure of the collegium as a surety for regaining 
his money, sooner or later, while the borrower called on the association’s atmosphere of sociability 
and friendship to be given some more scope. It was possibly, amongst other reasons, this 
opportunity to pool more finances within the collegium that motivated the navicularii maris 
Hadriatici to freely co-opt Cn. Sentius Felix as a member: Sentius was a rich municipal magistrate and 
patron who, as a quaestor aerarii Ostiensium, had some additional expertise in finance. It was very 
likely that Sentius, who presumably was not a shipper himself, could be called upon to financially 
back the ventures of his fellow navicularii.55 The fact that he was also patron of the bankers’ 
association (argentarii) probably implied that he could negotiate to provide the shippers with easy 
credit or cheap loans, and intervene when a shipper failed to repay in due time. Likewise, a sixth-
century papyrus refers to a short-term interest-free loan, granted by five members of an association 
of tow-workers to a fellow member.56 Not surprisingly, the agreement was made without mentioning 
surety or penalty, the association’s framework more or less guaranteed repayment. 
Apart from informal support by individual members, the collegium as an institution may have offered 
some financial advantages too. A papyrus with the regulations of a tenant farmers’ association, 
working on an Egyptian estate of Claudius, mentions that the association could stand security for one 
of the members: “if any one of the undersigned men is held for debt up to the amount of one 
hundred drachmai in silver, security will be given for him for a period of sixty days by the 
association”.57 Another ordinance from an association of unknown character, reads: “If anyone is 
given into custody for a private debt, let them [i.e. the collegiati] go bail for him up to one hundred 
silver drachmai for thirty days, within which he will release the men”.58 In much the same way, it was 
a common policy of Flemish medieval merchant guilds to intervene financially to support members 
who had been fined.59 It is likely that for this kind of emergency support, the money in the 
association’s fund was used, which collected donations from benefactors, entrance fees and monthly 
dues.60 We do not know if or to what extent this feature was also established in the western 
provinces, but at least the common chest gave collegia the possibility to financially back their 
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members. In addition to the financial support of fellow collegiati, this spare cash pool was again very 
advantageous to traders, for whom ready money was often essential to stay in business. 
 
Apart from this financial and practical aid, the collegium was also the right place to look for 
trustworthy business partners.  
First of all, a merchant-collegiatus had the opportunity to cooperate with colleagues who had the 
same professional interests and whose behavior was monitored by the association. Let us assume 
that a merchant was looking for a partner to set up a commercial societas. The association’s regular 
meetings were an ideal opportunity to make inquiries after the collegiati’s willingness and aptitude 
to join forces. The numerous societates, known from the tituli picti on Spanish oil amphorae may well 
reflect this mechanism. These painted inscriptions mention the names of the oil merchants and we 
often encounter two or more olearii working together to deliver a shipment.61 Most of the traders 
are only known from these small inscriptions, but some left traces in monumental epigraphy too and 
appear as collegiati. The aforementioned D. Caecilius Hospitalis was curator of the negotiatores 
olearii ex Baetica; M. Valerius Valens belonged to the olearii, probably the same association as the 
negotiatores olearii; and D. Caecilius Abascanthus and D. Caecilius Onesimus appear as members of 
the diffusores olearii.62 Caecilius Hospitalis is known to have cooperated with members of his familia, 
Caecilius Maternus and Caecilius Onesimus.63 This kind of inner-familia societates was very common, 
because, as with financing, the first option to find trustworthy partners implied turning to relatives, 
slaves and freedmen.64 Other societates were entered into by members from different familiae.65 The 
reason for cooperating with socii from outside the own background was obvious: pooling finances 
and resources from several familiae eased starting up the business enterprise.  
Sometimes, we can even delve deeper into the partnership’s actual motivation. In the middle of the 
second century, a few members of the well-known Spanish merchant family the DD. Caecilii 
combined forces with L. Aelius Optatus.66 The Spanish gens Aelia had large interests in the 
production and commercialization of oil and oil amphorae.67 We even possess some stamps on oil 
amphorae, reading L·AE·OP·COL, indicating that Optatus was not only active in the oil trade, but also 
produced his own amphorae, maybe on his estate near the river Guadalquivir.68 The Caecilii on the 
other hand are solely known as merchants. It is very well possible that Aelius Optatus provided the 
amphorae, and maybe also the oil, while the Caecilii were responsible for the actual shipping and 
selling. Hence, the societas offered Optatus an easy way to sell his produce and the Caecilii did not 
need to look for a supplier of merchandise. Why did these merchants trust each other to enter into a 
societas? We can easily imagine that they knew each other’s business history and past behavior as 
trading partners. Given the fact that they were also working and living in southern Spain, close to the 
Guadalquivir and the Mediterranean harbors, it is also possible that the two familiae had long been 
acquainted with each other outside the business world and that multiplex relationships were 
bonding them. In this case there was not really a need for a collegium to act as a vehicle to connect 
potential business partners.  
Yet, not all societates could rely on multiplex relationships. In the 160’s, a certain Cornelius Homullus 
worked together with Segolatius Encolpius.69 Nothing is known about Homullus, but it is feasible his 
roots lay in Barcelona, where the tomb of a Cornelia Homulla was found.70 Segolatius on the other 
hand is clearly a Gallic name. In monumental epigraphy, the gentilicium is only known in Narbonne.71 
In the tituli picti on the contrary, several Segolatii can be found.72 Apparently, Encolpius belonged to 
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a Gallic merchant family. The members usually worked alone or relied on their sons. So, apart from 
this one societas, there is no sign of a regular cooperation between the Gallic Segolatii and Spanish 
colleagues in the oil trade. How then did Homullus and Encolpius manage to gather information on 
each other’s trustworthiness? It may be that both had made inquiries in the merchants’ community 
about past behavior and reputation. However, if both belonged to the same professional association, 
checking the honesty of a business partner would have been very easy. Unfortunately, we do not 
know if Homullus or Encolpius had joined a collegium of oil merchants. The tituli never furnish this 
kind of information and the chances of finding their funerary inscriptions, on the assumption that 
they would even have bothered to mention their membership, are very small indeed. Nonetheless, 
we do find traces of Gallic oil merchants operating in Spanish commercial associations. C. Sentius 
Regulianus was a member of the diffusores olearii ex Baetica and even became one of the 
association’s curatores.73 Yet, his family and background is firmly rooted in the city of Lyon. Both the 
families of his grandfather L. Silenius Reginus and probable life partner Ulattia Metrodora are well 
attested in Lyons epigraphy.74 Moreover, Regulianus was also doing business in Gaul as a wine 
merchant and a shipper on the Saône. It is probable that he started out as a trader on the rivers of 
southern Gaul and later widened his scope to the oil business. His membership of the diffusores’ 
association should no doubt be seen as an attempt to gain access to his Spanish colleagues’ networks 
in order to back up his own enterprises. 
 
Next, a merchant-collegiatus could easily be integrated in the individual commercial networks of his 
colleagues. Obviously, over time each merchant had built up an individual network of reliable 
business agents, contractors and customers. Using the framework of the collegium, a trader had the 
chance to be introduced to a wider range of partners, which may result in better commercial 
opportunities.  
Let us return to the inscription of Cn. Sentius Felix, who was gratis adlectus inter navicularios maris 
Hadriatici.75 Apparently, the shippers highly appreciated him being a member and I already 
suggested that his wealth and financial expertise could be one of the major motives. Yet, we can take 
the argument even further. We can safely assume that the navicularii were mainly engaged in 
commercializing and transporting wine and oil which were produced in the coastal regions of the 
Adriatic.76 It is definitely no coincidence that one of the association’s curatores, L. Scribonius 
Ianuarius, was also a negotians vinarius.77 When we look at Sentius Felix’ professional career, it 
becomes clear that money was not the only reason why the shippers wanted to co-opt him as a 
member. Felix was patron of the negotiatores vinarii ab urbe and a collegiatus in an Ostian 
association of wine merchants, called ad quadrigam fori vinarii.78 For shippers who were most likely 
importing Italian wine to Ostia and Rome, these connections could imply immediate access to a 
network of wholesale buyers and ease the distribution of their merchandise. Moreover, he also held 
the patronage over two shippers’ associations, the scapharii and lenuncularii traiectus Luculli, which 
were both transporting goods along the Tiber. It is possible that a navicularius who wanted to sell his 
wine amphorae in Rome could rely on the connection with Felix or his intervention as a middleman 
to enter into a cheap transport contract or that his shipment was given priority. Finally, Felix had also 
received the patronage over the olearii. Once again, for shippers dealing in Italian oil, this probably 
meant easy access to the Ostian and Roman oil markets. 
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All these techniques of sharing and supporting can be labeled as positive ways to reduce trading 
costs. Yet, a collegium could probably also try to protect the members’ business interests in a 
negative way, viz. by denying merchants working outside the association a share in the finance and 
information or ostracizing them from the business network. Membership would then be required to 
successfully start up a business. This strategy is hard to trace in antiquity, but well documented in 
medieval or early modern trading societies.79 Still, we can imagine ostracism being actively used to 
safeguard an association’s dominant position. Let us return to the negotiatores vinarii in Lyon. At 
least two wine merchants, C. Apronius Raptor and M. Inthatius Vitalis, were also active as shippers 
on the Saône.80 Both were wealthy benefactors and patrons of merchant and shipper associations. 
We can imagine that a wine merchant who was not willing to join the corpus in Lyon, could easily be 
hindered in successfully doing business in Gaul. Raptor and Vitalis may use the connection with the 
nautae Ararici to prevent the merchant from acquiring transport means along the Saône. In Lyon, the 
negotiatores vinarii may contact their suppliers and customers and harm the merchant’s reputation. 
It should quickly become obvious that gaining access to the wine market in Lyon and hoping to stay 
in business for a longer period of time implied joining the corpus. We cannot indisputably prove that 
this regularly happened, but membership in several collegia and intertwining networks at least made 
this ostracism possible. 
 
However, once again, ancient sources are usually frustratingly quiet on how exactly these 
mechanisms could work within the framework of a professional collegium and we therefore need to 
rely on comparative evidence to get an idea of the potential support lines a Roman association could 
offer. By making use of medieval and early modern guild regulations, informal but closed trading 
communities and individual merchants’ networks, we have no problem in tracing all the techniques 
of pooling finance and resources, finding business partners and sharing networks, which sometimes 
are hinted upon in the scarce ancient sources but whose actual functioning is so hard to grasp.81  
 
Fama crescit eundo: benefits of sharing information 
 
Reduction of trading costs could also be achieved by sharing commercial information with fellow 
collegiati. Usually, merchants would try and shield trading opportunities from rivals to capture the 
profits themselves. However, being integrated into a collegium’s network implied collegiality and an 
honest collegiatus who was willing to help by tipping off fellow members on interesting 
opportunities, could expect favors in return. 
Various options are possible: merchants could inform colleagues about price fluctuations, abundance 
and shortages in distant markets they had just visited; about the trustworthiness of suppliers, 
customers, agents and other potential business partners; about dangers on the routes, political 
unrest, specific trading conditions in certain cities or regions etc.  
A few conceivable trading operations may indicate the possible advantages of spreading information 
within the collegium. 
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First, sharing data on (expected) yields, shortage and abundance can tackle the usually slow spread 
of commercial information and help merchants to be the first to take advantage of profitable trading 
opportunities. It is very well possible that the Ostian grain merchant P. Aufidius Fortis may have 
helped his collegiati in this way.82 Fortis probably originated from Hippo Regius in Africa, as he was a 
member of the political aristocracy of this city. We can safely assume that the Aufidii owned land in 
Africa, and very likely grain-producing estates. A third-century inscription, discovered in Bou Assid in 
Africa proconsularis, mentions a fundus Aufidianus.83 Fortis could easily gather information on the 
probable yields on his own estates and those of his fellow citizens. As the Ostian mercatores 
frumentarii were supplying the insatiable demand of the capital and customers would be plentiful, 
reliable information on the grain production in the provinciae frumentariae and the distribution of 
yields was no doubt essential. 
The merchant L. Caecilius Aemilianus may have done the same for the wine business.84 This former 
soldier was a decurio and duovir in the African city of Aelia Ulixibera, but also a member of an Ostian 
merchant association, called the collegium vinariorum inportatorum negotiantium, which supplied 
Ostia and Rome with wine.85 Being a member of the city council, it was very likely that Aemilianus 
possessed some estates in the vicinity of Aelia Ulixibera and that wine was produced on his lands. 
Hence, Aemilianus should be able to gather first hand information on the expected vintages and may 
have let his fellow merchants in Ostia know about the future yields.86  
 
Secondly, the collegium may also be used to circulate information on merchants and shippers outside 
the association. To illustrate the potential functioning of this mechanism in choosing business 
partners, we may construct a fictitious transport operation, taking place in southern Gaul and 
involving shippers and wine merchants. Let us start with the funerary inscription of Q. Capitonius 
Probatus, a Gallic navicularius marinus who was an augustalis in both Lyon and Puteoli.87 Apparently, 
Probatus was trading regularly between Italy and Gaul and honored twice with the membership of 
the collegium augustalium. He may well have been shipping Greek and Italian wines to the Gallic 
markets. The man was buried by two of his freedmen, Nereus and Palaemon, whose cognomina, 
probably not by mere coincidence, both referred to maritime gods. They may have cooperated with 
their patron in his maritime business. Let us assume that Probatus bought wine amphorae in Puteoli, 
made the trip to Arles and there handed over the wares to his freedmen, who were then to transport 
the wine to Lyon and sell the cargo. Nereus and Palaemon made a contract with L. Helvius Frugi, 
curator and patron of the shippers on the Rhône and Saône, to transport the amphorae to Lyon.88 
Upon arriving in Lyon however, they failed to pay the freight charges. In an act of revenge, Frugi then 
may have spread the rumor about the Capitonii’s unreliability in Lyon’s society. By first warning his 
collegiati, the Capitonii would have found difficulties the next time they were trying to obtain 
transport means. Moreover, a few members of the shippers on the Saône were also engaged in the 
association of wine merchants.89 As Frugi knew that Nereus and Palaemon would try to sell the wine 
on the market in Lyon, he might have warned the negotiatores vinarii in the shippers’ association to 
beware of these unreliable business partners. The information about the Capitonii may have reached 
the wine merchants in yet another way. Helvius Frugi was a municipal magistrate in Vienne and 
probably related to P. Helvius Masso, who was also residing in Vienne’s city council.90 Masso was 
married to a certain Apronia Casata, who may have been related to the famous wine merchant and 
shipper on the Saône, C. Apronius Raptor. These family ties could, in addition to the collegium’s 
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network, support the spread of information. In the end, this short commercial tale would probably 
result in a severe damage of the Capitonii’s social credit in Lyon’s trading community and a possible 
ostracism from the wine merchants’ confidence. Collective punishment by the nautae and 
negotiatores vinarii may even ban them from Lyon’s market altogether.  
 
Likewise, the collegium can be used to circulate information about suppliers. A Gallic wine merchant 
as C. Sentius Regulianus, who broadened his scope to the Spanish oil trade, would benefit greatly by 
the membership of the Spanish association of the diffusores olearii.91 Sentius could probably not rely 
on a personal network of information on oil producers and amphorae potters in Baetica. Here again, 
the collegiati, who were sometimes engaged in production themselves, could offer Sentius ready 
information on reliable partners and save him valuable trading time.92 
 
Hence, spreading information on the (dis)honesty of business partners who were not closely related 
to any of the collegiati reduced the risk of cooperating with a potentially fraudulent merchant. A 
single merchant would find it hard to assess the trustworthiness of each and every business partner, 
but the ‘collective memory’ of the collegiati on the other hand was able to pool, distribute and 
preserve much more information on the past behavior of traders and shippers outside the 
association. This way a new member could be presented an informal ‘archive’, as it were, of previous 
trading relations and use this to find honest business partners. Moreover, once this mechanism was 
fully operational, non-collegiati would recognize the probable implications of cheating on an 
association’s member. Theoretically, in the end all members would be better protected against 
fraudulent partners.93 
 
Horizontal protection: misbehavior within the collegium 
 
Next, there is also a chance collegia tried to protect their members against fellow colleagues’ 
misbehavior. An association could indeed attempt to act against a free rider who was willing to 
accept transport contracts or sell his wares below the market price, thereby damaging the business 
potential of other collegiati. Evidence for associations trying to reach an agreement on wages and 
prices is however scarce and hardly representative.  
The well-known ordinance issued in 47 AD by the association of the salt merchants of Tebtynis, 
stated that members “shall sell the good salt at the rate of two and one-half obols, the light salt at 
two obols, and the lighter salt at one and one-half obol, by our measure or that of the warehouse. 
And if anyone shall sell at a lower price than these, let him be fined eight drachmai in silver for the 
common fund and the same for the public treasury”.94 This lex protected the members against price 
cutting, but allowed them to sell at a higher price. Given the limited geographical range and the small 
size of the association, close monitoring by the collegiati seemed very easy. As an additional control, 
the ordinance gave the superintendent Apunchis the right to take a collegiatus into custody who was 
not able to render a clear account of his sales. Yet, this papyrus represents a rather exceptional case, 
as the association had obtained from the Roman state the monopolistic concession to sell salt in 
Tebtynis and a few neighboring villages. Boak has convincingly shown that the price to buy the 
monopoly represented a percentage of the total amount of money the association annually earned 
  
16 
with a minimal return guaranteed.95 Hence, it was necessary to negotiate minimum prices: the 
members probably had an rough idea of the annual amounts that would be sold and their profits, so 
they were able to agree upon a price which would at least assure them a break even. For larger 
associations with a wider interregional range, like the negotiatores vinarii in Lyon, a similar 
arrangement may be much more difficult to enforce, because there was no need to pay for a 
monopoly price. Moreover, as the wine merchants were trading in the whole of southern and central 
Gaul, each member’s business transactions could hardly be checked. Nonetheless, comparative 
evidence on medieval and early modern merchant guilds points out that the framework of the 
association was often used to prevent internal competition by allocating sales quota.96 Hence, the 
Egyptian lex indicates that if price management was relevant to the collegium, enforcing minimum 
prices lay within the association’s power. 
 
Further, an association could also attempt to protect the collegiati against too powerful members 
who threatened to monopolize all the major business deals. Merchants who were integrated in 
better and larger networks or could rely on larger personal financial resources may have been able to 
dominate the local market and take away their colleagues’ commercial opportunities. Being a 
structure to increase sociability and mutual economic support, the collegium was likely to intervene. 
At least, this is the implication of a second part of the aforementioned Egyptian salt merchants’ lex. 
The ordinance reads: “if any of them [i.e. the collegiati] shall be found to have sold more than a 
stater's worth of salt to a merchant, let him be fined eight drachmai in silver for the common fund 
and the same for the public treasury; but if the merchant shall intend to buy more than four 
drachmai's worth, all must sell to him jointly”. This regulation guaranteed the members an equal 
share in a large commercial assignment. Again however, it is hard to judge how common this kind of 
protection was included in an association’s lex. 
 
Finally, an association could offer protection against collegiati’s misbehavior outside the business 
world. The main motivation was obviously that the association was meant to be a place of friendship 
and sociability and members were not supposed to trouble, slander or attack each other. Hence, the 
lex of an unknown Egyptian association states that “if anyone prosecutes another or defames him, let 
him be fined eight drachmai; if anyone intrigues against another or corrupts his home, let him be 
fined eight drachmai”.97 Indirectly, this regulation also safeguarded a merchant’s business. By 
declaring that strife should be dealt with internally, without outsiders intermingling, the collegium 
first protected his own reputation, as it was able to monitor the members’ behavior. Secondly, each 
member’s individual reputation and social credit in the trading community was preserved, as no 
merchant benefitted from the name of being litigious. Forbidding slander served the same purpose 
and assured the collegiati’s fame. 
 
Disputes between members were no doubt settled on the frequent meetings and banquets, which 
were the ultimate expression of the association’s sociability and closure. Hence, attending those 
meetings was crucial to enhance solidarity and amicitia, but also to regularly solve internal quarrels 
and problems. It comes as no surprise then that the ordinances of several Egyptian associations 
clearly mark the fines which were to be imposed on anyone who was missing.98 
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Vertical protection: patronage and mutual business interests 
 
Traditionally, the possibility of joint action and communication is seen as the foremost reason to 
form an association. Being a member of a collegium assumed being better protected against 
predation by higher institutional levels, being backed by the collegiati in resolving disputes with local 
or imperial political and administrative bodies, and being able to communicate personal wishes and 
worries more effectively.  
 
An association’s first option was to have the magistrates communicate grievance and complaints to 
the appropriate level of administration and consequently take or threaten joint action. Threatening 
to withhold from trade and transport activities as a medium to defend the merchants’ interests 
required cooperation and solidarity, as a single merchant ignoring the threat of joint action would 
undermine the association’s power.99 The collegium and his framework of closure and multiplex 
relationships, proved to be an excellent vehicle to assure joint action. A fine example of a commercial 
association mediating between the collegiati and the Roman administration can be found in the 
conflict between the navicularii of Arles, working for the annona, and the provincial procurator.100 
The exact details do not have to concern us right now, but apparently the shippers were transporting 
fiscal wares to Rome. Upon arriving in Ostia, they found out that the documents provided by the 
procurator did not match the actual cargo. They filed a complaint with the highest authority for 
Rome’s supply system, the praefectus annonae, and threatened to stop the shipments if nothing was 
done. The praefectus agreed with the shippers and immediately took action. Obviously, he perfectly 
understood the impact of losing valuable transport means. All the praefectus’ regulations were then 
engraved on a bronze plate, which was probably exposed in the association’s schola as clear proof 
that the members’ interests were protected by Rome.101 There are also a few papyri documenting 
the collective cessation of work by professional associations.102 
It was also a collegium’s duty to negotiate for rights and privileges. Trying to receive exemption from 
obligations, tolls and taxes; obtaining monopoly rights and assuring governmental protection of 
trading privileges would evidently benefit all members. For instance, in 139 AD, an Egyptian 
association of weavers sent a petition to the strategus, asking to be freed from public duties.103 It 
turned out that four of the twelve collegiati had been assigned the liturgy of epiplous, while the 
Roman state has just placed a large order for clothing. The weavers feared they would not be able to 
deliver the goods on time and the association pleaded for exemption. 
 
Next, a collegium could also rely on the patron and his connections to defend their interests. 
Associations usually offered patronage to an influential individual who was supposed to advocate 
their rights and communicate concerns to higher levels; to a wealthy person who was expected to 
shower the members with gifts and dinners; or preferably to someone who was able to fulfill both 
prospects.104 For this paper I will pass over most of the social and civic aspects of patronage and 
concentrate on a few cases in which the patron’s support could have very direct economic 
consequences. 
First, collegia could try and co-opt a member of the imperial administration, who could immediately 
and personally intervene when the association’s interests were threatened. The Spanish oil 
merchants proved to be most successful here, as they managed to attract the praefectus annonae 
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himself.105 Being the highest authority in Rome’s supply system, the praefectus would prove to be a 
valuable asset in obtaining transport contracts and safeguarding contract enforcement. Likewise, the 
transport business of the shippers from Arles no doubt benefitted from the patronage of a 
procurator ad annonam provinciae Narbonensis et Liguriae.106 
Secondly, collegiati were particularly keen on co-opting a member of the local political aristocracy. 
Apart from the prestige and wealth a similar patron had to present, the association obtained a direct 
link to the city council. Examples abound and the inscription memorializing C. Cassius Paternus, 
decurio in Cimiez and patron of the utriclarii, acting as a generous benefactor, is very typical.107 Often 
however, those patrons shared some common business interests with the collegiati, without being a 
member of the association. The connection between the Ostian mensores frumentarii and their 
patron, the grain merchant and municipal aristocrat P. Aufidius Fortis, hardly needs explanation.108 
Similarly, many Ostian collegia were convinced they would benefit from the patronage of Cn. Sentius 
Felix, who not only had completed the local cursus honorum and adopted a member of the most 
influential Ostian family, the Lucilii Gamalae, but also possessed an extensive commercial network in 
the wine trade and shipping business. His inscription testifies of the truly astonishing amount of 
patronages he collected.109  
At a slightly lower level, associations also valued patronage by wealthy seviri augustales. This 
honorary function was usually occupied by rich freedmen with a past in business. As they were 
former slaves, entering the city council was evidently not an option, but membership of the 
prestigious religious association and status enhancing vehicle proved to be an alternative.110 Seviri 
might not have been able to generate the same level of protection, nonetheless, their wealth, status 
and connections were still regarded as an asset to the collegium. Especially smaller associations, like 
the shippers on lake Como, who perhaps had failed to co-opt a decurio, found a reasonable 
substitute in addressing a sevir.111 Very similar to patronage by decuriones, the choice of a particular 
sevir was often influenced by economic motives. The sevir and navicularius marinus M. Frontonius 
Euporus was co-opted by the local associations of the shippers on the Durance and the utriclarii from 
Saint-Gabriël.112 No doubt the two collegia expected their patron to make use of their services to 
have his wares transported in southern Gaul. This way both associations tried to assure their 
collegiati of frequent transport contracts. Reciprocally, Euporus’ businesses would certainly be given 
priority and being a patron, he may even have received cheaper transport. The benefits of this 
patronage clearly operated in both directions.  
Next, an association may think it worthwhile to co-opt a famous and well-to-do collegiatus who had 
developed a particularly interesting network of business contacts. He was bound to be very well 
acquainted with the particular wishes and complaints businessmen wanted to be communicated and 
be dealt with. By officially awarding him the honorary title of patronus, the association aimed at 
‘institutionalizing’ this network as a common tool to be shared by all members. The inscription of the 
aforementioned C. Sentius Regulianus, who operated as a wine merchant, shipper on the Saône and 
oil trader, can be cited here.113 He was elected patron of both the negotiatores vinarii and the nautae 
Ararici, for very obvious reasons: by choosing the same person as a protector of associations with 
very similar business interests, the collegia and their members were closely intertwined and 
enhanced the integration of individual networks. 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper has explored some of the possible economic aspects of the Roman collegia which may 
have helped merchants to organize their business more efficiently and tackle fundamental problems 
of exchange. Protection against fraud and predation, assistance in selecting and monitoring agents 
and business relations, pooling finance and information are but some of the possible advantages a 
merchant association had to offer. To which extent a collegium actually managed to incorporate the 
various protection mechanisms, obviously depended on each association’s specific features, like 
geographical range, membership figures, socio-economic status of the collegiati, relationships with 
other associations, connections with the city council etc. No doubt the association of wine merchants 
in Lyon or the grain traders in Ostia, both of which were directly linked to the municipal aristocracy 
and could rely on an extensive network with other commercial collegia, would offer their members 
better chances of protection against the hazards of long-distance trade than a small collegium of 
nautae in Viminacium in Moesia superior.114 
Yet, the framework of the collegium was definitely not the only way to try and beat the shortcomings 
of the Roman trading world. Social networking or relying on one’s familia were no doubt similar 
means to reduce trading costs, diminish risk and uncertainty and widen the profit margin. Hence, I 
argue that the collegium operated as an alternative or, more likely, an addition to other vehicles 
which tried to enhance trading efficiency and transparency in an imperfect market. This way, I reach 
very similar conclusions for the functioning of collegia in the Roman world as Gelderblom and Grafe 
did very recently for the medieval and early modern merchant guilds: “Merchants typically used 
combinations of institutions to solve one particular problem, but each of these institutions in turn 
contributed to solving multiple problems”.115 No doubt the collegium was one of these institutions 
and to judge by the wide spread of the phenomenon, a particularly efficient one. 
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